IRONY of ironies. Noynoy Aquino appears to be facing the same predicament in dealing with the pork barrel and Malampaya scandals as Marcos did in the wake of the assassination of Ninoy.
The Aquino government is experiencing the same erosion of credibility, the same cloud of suspicion and distrust, as the Marcos dictatorship. Thus, any assurance from Aquino or Leila de Lima or the leaders of both houses of Congress that the massive plunder of the national treasury will be thoroughly investigated and the guilty parties brought to justice, regardless of their political colors, is being met with raised eyebrows.
First of all, the actuations of those tasked with investigating the scandals have not been reassuring, fueling fears of both a selective cover-up and a selective prosecution. Chiz Escudero said it all when he called on De Lima to “stop lawyering for Napoles.”
This was the situation that Marcos had to confront after Ninoy’s brutal murder.
Because of the persecution that Ninoy had endured under Marcos and the circumstances preceding his return from exile, virtually everyone had concluded that the assassination had been planned at the very top. Even the Western press had drawn the conclusion that Marcos was behind the killing. In fact, even the highest officials in the Marcos government had misgivings.
An official statement was crafted by the Ministry of Public Information for publication in the US press, giving the assurance of a fair and thorough probe by an “independent commission” headed by Chief Justice Enrique Fernando. But it needed an attribution to a high official of the Marcos government. Foreign Secretary Carlos P. Romulo, who was at the United Nations, balked at the suggestion that the statement should be attributed to him. He reportedly declared, “If you use my name, I will deny it.”
Prime Minister Cesar Virata, who was at the World Bank at the time, was then asked if the statement could be attributed to him. He agreed but only on condition that he would be allowed to rewrite it. However, when it was finally rewritten, based on his suggestions, he changed his mind and decided against signing the document.
I am personally familiar with this. I was in the room alone with Virata, in Washington DC, reworking and rewriting that document with him.
Desperate to regain credibility, which was further eroded with the resignation of the members of the Fernando Commission, Marcos created another one, referred to as the Agrava Commission because it was chaired by former Court of Appeals Justice Corazon J. Agrava. Its members were lawyer Luciano E. Salazar, businessman Dante G. Santos, labor leader Ernesto F. Herrera, and educator Amado C. Dizon.
The Agrava Commission went to work under the close scrutiny of media and an aroused citizenry. It eventually came up with two reports: a Majority Report (so-called because majority of the members had crafted it) and a Minority Report, attributed to Agrava alone. The difference was that the former report recommended the indictment of several members of the Armed Forces, including AFP Chief of Staff Fabian Ver, Brig. Gen. Luther Custodio and Gen. Prospero Olivas. On the other hand, Agrava insisted on exonerating Ver.
Worse yet, the Sandiganbayan subsequently acquitted all the indictees, ostensibly due to insufficient evidence. It took a People Power Revolt and the assumption of the presidency by Cory Aquino for those acquitted to be brought to trial again and to be convicted.
Against this background, Noynoy Aquino may have to face up to the harsh reality that his protestations of impartiality and adherence to Daang Matuwid has begun to ring hollow among an increasingly cynical citizenry.
The slow process of building an airtight case and clearing the names of those unjustly included in the various “Napolists” will exacerbate the perception of a cover-up.
And yet, justice demands that every single allegation of guilt must be supported by evidence. Even those who have already been adjudged guilty by a blood-thirsty public and pre-crucified in media deserve to be treated as innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. That is the law.
Sadly, the tendency of certain parties to gain media mileage from the scandal, the often irresponsible speculative-cum-investigative journalism being foisted on a gossip-hungry public, the distrust that those concerned have for each other, the amateurish gathering of evidence by the NBI (as well as rumors that some agents were extorting money from Napoles) – all these have provided fodder for a cynical public.
Public distrust has also been heightened by Aquino’s vote of confidence for Budget Secretary Florencio Abad, in spite of the many innuendoes linking him to Napoles, as well as the palace announcement that no member of the cabinet will be suspended without “sufficient evidence.”
If these officials had any concern for their boss, they would have offered to go on leave while the controversy is raging, to spare Aquino from the gauntlet of adverse public opinion. But that may be expecting too much from people with no delicadeza.
Aquino could, thus, end his term being remembered as much for allegations of a whitewash as for the prosecution (if it happens) of some of the principal suspects in the scam. That would be unfortunate for a presidency that started off on high hopes.
I personally believe that Aquino is trying to do the right thing and that he would like to live up to his promise of reforms. But he appears to be fair game for self-serving advisers, desperate to survive, and he is afflicted by a stubborn sense of loyalty for members of his cordon sanitaire.
If this were not the case, he would have allowed, early on, full access to the records of the Department of Budget and full release of the findings of the Commission on Audit, the better to confirm or negate the devastating insinuations in the financial records of whistle-blower Benhur Luy and the various lists attributed to Napoles.
And having seen a list (by his own admission) of alleged recipients of dirty money from Napoles, he should have immediately made that public and allowed the justice system to take over.
In the first place, Aquino should not have allowed Napoles to surrender to him personally, and in Malacañang at that, nor should he have agreed to escort her to PNP headquarters, along with Mar Roxas. That triggered the erosion of credibility.
To say that Aquino, De Lima, the Blue Ribbon Committee and even Ping Lacson have made a messy situation even messier is an understatement. The bottom line is that, the Filipino people need to be convinced that this government is sincere in its announced effort to bring the plunderers to justice. That won’t be easy.
Aquino will either be convinced by his advisers that he can afford to ignore the protesting masses, or he will take the option that Marcos chose: frontally address the issue of credibility by creating an independent and impartial commission to investigate the scandals and to recommend prosecution of those found culpable. Surely, there are still individuals who are beyond reproach who can be appointed to the commission.
And that’s not even the end of it. We must also hope that such a commission will not come up with a Majority Report and a Minority Report like that of Agrava. And that it will not take a People Power Revolt to see that justice is finally done.
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